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Aloisio Araujo and Alvaro Sandroni have shown in [1] that in a complete-markets economy 
in which there are no exogenous bounds to financial trade, existence of equilibrium requires 
agents with prior beliefs that agree on zero-probability events, and, therefore, with 
asymptotically homogeneous posteriors. This note illustrates the extent to which the result 
depends on market completeness: in general, equilibrium requires compatibility of beliefs 
only up to the revenue transfer opportunities allowed by the market; when the market is 
sufficiently incomplete, generically on the space of asset returns, even individuals who 
disagree on zero-probability events meet that “constrained-compatibility” requirement. 
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NO-EQUIVALENCIA DE EXPECTATIVAS E INTERCAMBIO 
FINANCIERO: UN COMENTARIO A UN RESULTADO DE 






Aloisio Araujo y Alvaro Sandroni han mostrado en [1] que en una economía con mercados 
completos en la que no existen restricciones exógenas al intercambio en mercados 
financieros, la existencia del equilibrio requiere que las expectativas (priors) de los agentes 
sobre eventos de probabilidad cero coincidan y, por lo tanto, que sean asintóticamente 
homogéneas (las posteriores).  Esta nota ilustra qué tanto el resultado depende de la 
completitud de los mercados: en general, la existencia del equilibrio requiere la 
compatibilidad de las expectativas (priors) condicionales a las transferencias permitidas por 
los mercados; cuando el mercado es lo suficientemente incompleto, genéricamente en el 
espacio de los retornos de los activos, aún individuos que discrepan en eventos de 
probabilidad cero, satisfacen esta restricción de “compatibilidad – restringida”. 
 
Palabras clave: equilibrio general, expectativas heterogéneas, existencia. 
 
Clasificación JEL: D52, G1. 
 
 
 In models that study the eﬀects of belief heterogeneity in ﬁnancial markets, it is often-
times assumed that agents agree on what events have zero probability of occurring (e.g. [9],
[7]), and/or that trades, in particular short sales, are exogenously bounded (e.g. [10], [5]
and [4]). In [1], Aloisio Araujo and Alvaro Sandroni have shown that in an (inﬁnite-horizon)
economy with complete ﬁnancial markets one of these two assumptions is indeed necessary:
in their proof that competitive equilibrium exists only if all individuals have asymptotically
homogeneous posterior beliefs, their argument is twofold: ﬁrst, if prior beliefs do not coin-
cide in the events to which zero probability is attached, then unbounded trading strategies,
inconsistent with market clearing, are determined by individual optimization; and, second,
when prior beliefs coincide in their null events, then, by the Blackwell-Dubbins theorem (see
[3]), individual posterior beliefs will be asymptotically homogeneous.
Here, we study a similar problem without the assumption that markets are complete,
and argue that, if ﬁnancial markets are suﬃciently incomplete, equilibrium trade generically
exists, even when individual beliefs disagree on the null events. We consider a simple, two-
period problem with a ﬁnite set of future states of the world. This setting suﬃces for our
purposes, since, given the negative nature of our results, we will not invoke the Blackwell-
Dubbins theorem. In contrast to the standard two-period problem, however, and since
we want to allow unbounded trade, we assume that individuals only avoid bankruptcy
almost surely according to their own beliefs.1 The latter implies that the standard existence
argument of [6] does not apply - indeed, neither does the general deﬁnition of no-arbitrage,
nor its characterization via state-prices, since diﬀerent individuals exhibit non-monotonic
utility with respect to consumption in diﬀerent states (see [2]).
We ﬁrst introduce a condition on individual beliefs that makes them (pairwise) consistent
up to the trading opportunities oﬀered by the (possibly incomplete) asset market. We show
1But traders do not take into account the possibility that someone else may go bankrupt. In this sense,
we only consider an ex-ante problem with somewhat naive consumers, unlike in [8].
2that the condition is necessary for the existence of equilibrium prices for trade between two
individuals. Using an argument similar to [6], and with some qualiﬁcation, we also show
that the condition is suﬃcient. When markets are complete, the condition is equivalent to
requiring agreement on zero-probability events. However, we show that even when individual
beliefs disagree in their null events, if markets are suﬃciently incomplete then the condition
is satisﬁed in a generic set of asset returns.
1 Constrained-compatible beliefs
I = {1,...,I},w i t hI ∈ N, is a society.
S = {1,...,S},w i t hS ∈ N, is the set of future states of the world. s =0is used to
denote the present date.
A = {1,...,A},w i t hA ∈ N, is the set of assets. The return of asset a ∈ A is the






∈ RA, taken as a row
vector. Assume that r1 À 0. A portfolio is a (column) vector z ∈ RA.
For each i ∈ I, ui : R −→ R is a monotone, continuous utility function, πi : P (S) −→





s=0 ∈ RS+1 is state-
contingent wealth. We assume that wi
0 > 0,a n dwi
s > 0 for every s ∈ Si.
Asset prices are denoted by q ∈ RA, which is taken as a row vector.
Given prices q,d e ﬁne
Bi (q)=
©
z ∈ RA¯ ¯wi
0 − qz ≥ 0 and ∀s ∈ Si,w i
s + rsz ≥ 0
ª
,
2This is, Si =
©
s ∈ S|πi ({s}) > 0
ª
3and vi














Individual demand correspondences are, then, Zi : RA ⇒ RA,d e ﬁned by




which implies that each individual considers as feasible trading strategies which are aﬀord-
able and for which, according to her own beliefs, probability of bankruptcy is nil.3
Lemma 1 For each i ∈ I, Zi (q) 6= ∅ if, and only if,
1. There does not exist z ∈ RA such that qz < 0 and πi ({s|rsz<0})=0 ;
2. There does not exist z ∈ RA such that qz =0 , πi ({s|rsz<0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) >
0.
Proof. Proofs of lemmata are in the appendix.
We now impose a deﬁnition of belief compatibility that is mediated by the revenue
transfers allowed by the ﬁnancial markets.4
Deﬁnition 1 j’s beliefs are constrained-compatible with i’s beliefs if there does not exist
z ∈ RA such that πi ({s|rsz<0})=0 , πj ({s|rsz>0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0.
That is, j’s beliefs are constrained compatible with i’s beliefs if the ﬁnancial markets
do not allow i to buy from j at r a d es u c ht h a ti thinks she cannot lose revenue and may
actually win some, and j thinks he cannot lose either.





≥ 0. Alternatively, we
could lift all nonnegativivity constraints and impose Inada conditions on each ui, which would yield the
same results.
4Hence the name: here “constrained” signiﬁe st h es a m ea si nt h ed e ﬁnition of “constrained suboptimality”
of [6].
4A simple characterization of constrained compatibility of beliefs is provided by the the-

























To see this, notice that, by deﬁnition, j’s beliefs are constrained compatible with i’s beliefs
if, and only if, there exists no solution to the system
∀s ∈ Si,r sz ≥ 0
∀s ∈ Sj,r sz ≤ 0
∃s ∈ Si : rsz>0








∀s ∈ Si ∩ Sj,r sz =0
∀s ∈ Si\Sj,(−rs)z ≤ 0
∀s ∈ Sj\Si,r sz ≤ 0
and it follows from [12, §22.2] that there exists no solution to the system if, and only if, for
some (α,β,γ,δ) ∈ R|Si\Sj|
+ × R|Si∩Sj| × R
Sj\Si


















s = αs + δ>0, β
i
s = βs and γi
s = γs ≥ 0 yields the result.
2T r a d e
Deﬁnition 2 We say that agents (i,j) ∈ I2, i 6= j, trade, if there exists q ∈ RA such that
Zi (q) ∩− Zj (q) 6= ∅.
We ﬁrst show that constrained compatibility of beliefs is necessary for (i,j) to trade.
Proposition 1 If (i,j) trade, then j’s beliefs are constrained-compatible with i’s beliefs (and
vice versa).
Proof. Suppose not: let q ∈ RA be such that Zi (q) ∩− Zj (q) 6= ∅ and let z ∈ RA be such
that πi ({s|rsz<0})=0 , πj ({s|rsz>0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0.
If qz < 0,s i n c eπi ({s|rsz<0})=0 , then by lemma 1, part 1, Zi (q)=∅.
If q (−z) < 0,s i n c eπj ({s|rs (−z) < 0})=0 , then, again by lemma 1, part 1, Zj (q)=∅.
Finally, if q · z =0 ,s i n c eπi ({s|rsz<0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0, by lemma 1,
part 2, Zi (q)=∅.
Since we are allowing bankruptcy in some states, suﬃciency cannot be claimed from [6].
The proof is complicated by the fact that under beliefs that disagree on null events, the
standard characterization of the set of no-arbitrage prices fails. For simplicity, we avoid
these complications by using only positive, linearly independent assets. We follow [6], by
imposing bounds on individual trades and apply the ﬁxed-point argument to the bounded
economy, where arbitrage poses no diﬃculty. We then relax the bounds asymptotically and
use constrained compatibility to argue existence of trade even when only the nonnegativity
constraints on states with positive probability, and not the artiﬁcial bounds, are imposed.
6Proposition 2 Suppose that each ra > 0 and that {ra}a∈A are linearly independent. Let
(i,j) ∈ I2 be such that ∀s ∈ S, πi ({s}) > 0 or πj ({s}) > 0.I fj’s beliefs are constrained-
compatible with i’s beliefs, and vice versa, then (i,j) trade.
Proof. Let Q =
½







Fix n ∈ N.
For each k ∈ {i,j},d e ﬁne the truncated budget correspondence Bk




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩






− qz ≥ 0
∀s ∈ Sk,wk
s + rsz ≥ 0
0 ≤ z0 ≤ (n +1 )wk
0
∀a ∈ A,−n ≤ za ≤ n
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,
which is a nonempty-, compact- and convex-valued correspondence, and is upper hemicon-
tinuous. To show that Bk
n is lower hemicontinuous, let
T =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
z =( z0,z) ∈ R × RA¯ ¯
∀s ∈ Sk,w k
s + rsz ≥ 0
0 ≤ z0 ≤ (n +1 )wk
0
∀a ∈ A,−n ≤ za ≤ n
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
,





− qz. It is straight-
forward that f is continuous in q and concave in z,a n d ,s i n c ewk
0 > 0 and for every s ∈ Sk,
wk
s > 0, for every q ∈ Q there exists z ∈ T for which f (q,z) > 0. This implies, by [11,
§9.15], that Bk
n is lower hemicontinuous.
By the theorem of the maximum, it follows that the individual bounded demand corre-
7spondence Zk
n : Q ⇒ RA+1,d e ﬁned as
Zk














is upper hemicontinuous. This correspondence is also nonempty-, convex- and compact-
valued.

































It follows by construction that Φ is nonempty-, convex- and compact-valued, and upper
hemicontinuous, so, by Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem, there exists (qn,zn) ∈ Q × N such
that (qn,zn) ∈ Φ(qn,zn).
Since zn ∈ Zi
n (qn)+Zj
n (qn),t h e nzn = zi
n +zj





























it follows that zn,0 − wi
0 − w
j
0 ≤ 0 and zn ≤ 0.A l s o , s i n c e qn > 0,i fzn,a < 0 for some







+qnzn < 0) and, since ra > 0 and for
every s ∈ S,b yh y p o t h e s i s ,πi ({s}) > 0 or πj ({s}) > 0, it follows that for some k ∈ {i,j},
zk
a = n everywhere in Zk
n (qn),s ozn,a < 0 would require zl
a < −n for l ∈ {i,j}\{k},f o r
some zl ∈ Zl
n (qn), which is impossible. It follows that zn =0 .
Similarly, notice that if qn,0 =0 , then, by monotonicity, for all k ∈ {i,j},e v e r y -
8where in Zk
n (qn), zk
0 =( n +1 )wk










> 0 which is im-











+ qnzn =0and zn =0 ).
























n is bounded and we now show that zi
n is bounded as well.
First, notice that





n=1 is bounded below;










n=1 is bounded above.





n=1 is unbounded above. Then, for some
z ∈ RA with rb sz>0,w eh a v et h a t ,b y1 ,
πi ({s}) > 0= ⇒ rsz ≥ 0
and, by 2,
πj ({s}) > 0= ⇒ rsz ≤ 0
Again by 2, πj ({b s})=0 , so it follows that πi ({b s}) > 0, which would contradict the fact
that j’s beliefs are constrained compatible with i’s beliefs.





n=1 is bounded above, and since i’s beliefs are constrained





n=1 is bounded below. Since





n=1 is bounded, and since preferences












93 Constrained compatibility and equivalence of beliefs
Recall that πi is said to be absolutely continuous with respect to πj if πj ({s})=0implies
that πi ({s})=0 . This is the property that [1] uses, via the Blackwell-Dubbins theorem, to
imply convergence of conditional beliefs under complete markets. Notice ﬁr s tt h a ta b s o l u t e
continuity is stronger than constrained compatibility.
Proposition 3 If πi is absolutely continuous with respect to πj,t h e nj’s beliefs are constrained-
compatible with i’s beliefs.
Proof. Let z ∈ RA be such that πj ({s|rsz>0})=0 . By absolute continuity of πj with
respect to πi, it is immediate that πi ({s|rsz>0})=0 .
Now, the next proposition shows that, under complete markets, absolute continuity
of πi with respect to πj is equivalent to constrained compatibility of j’s beliefs with i’s
beliefs, which is to say that, when markets are complete, as in [1], trade requires absolutely
continuous beliefs.
Proposition 4 Suppose that S = A,a n d{ra}a∈A are linearly independent. If j’s beliefs
are constrained-compatible with i’s beliefs, then πi is absolutely continuous with respect to
πj.
Proof. Suppose not: let b s ∈ S such that πj ({b s})=0and πi ({b s}) > 0.L e tz be such that
rb sz =1 , while rsz =0for every s ∈ S\{b s}, which exists by linear independence. Then,
πi ({s|rsz<0})=0 , πj ({s|rsz>0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0.
The point of this note is that the necessity of absolute continuity only occurs by accident
when markets are suﬃciently incomplete.
Fix (i,j) and assume that for every s ∈ S,e i t h e rπi ({s}) > 0 or πj ({s}) > 0.
10Reorganizing states, let s ∈ S be such that
¡
πi ({s}) > 0 ⇐⇒ s ≤ s
¢
and let s ∈ S be
such that
¡
πj ({s}) > 0 ⇐⇒ s ≥ s
¢
. By assumption, s ≤ s +1 .




++ × R++ ×
¡





















s=1 (rsz + αs)rsz +
Ps
s=s rsz − γ
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.





















Proof. Suppose ﬁrst that j’s beliefs are not constrained compatible with i’s beliefs, and
ﬁx z ∈ RA such that πi ({s|rsz<0})=0 , πj ({s|rsz>0})=0and πi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0.
Deﬁne

















11It is immediate that α ∈ R
s−1
++ and β ∈ R
S−s
++ ,w h e r e a s ,s i n c eπi ({s|rsz>0}) > 0, γ ∈ R++.
Notice that
rsz<0= ⇒ πi ({s})=0= ⇒ s>s
rsz>0= ⇒ πj ({s})=0= ⇒ s<s
Since s < s +1 , it follows that
s ≤ s − 1= ⇒ rsz ≥ 0
s ≤ s ≤ s =⇒ rsz =0
s ≥ s +1 = ⇒ rsz ≤ 0
Let s ≤ s − 1.I frsz>0,t h e nαs = rsz,s o(rsz − αs)rsz =0 ; alternatively, rsz =0and
the same conclusion is immediate. For s ≤ s ≤ s, it is immediate that rsz =0 .N o w , i f
s ≥ s+1and rsz<0,t h e nβs = −rsz,s o(rsz + βs)rsz =0 ; alternatively, rsz =0and the
same conclusion follows. It is also clear that
Ps
s=1 (rsz + αs)rsz − γ =0 .

















++ × R++ ×
¡
RA¢S.L e ts ∈ S be such that rsz<0; then, since α À 0, it follows that
s ≥ s +1 , and hence πi ({s})=0 . If, on the other hand, s ∈ S is such that rsz>0,
then, because β À 0, it follows that s ≤ s − 1 and hence πj ({s})=0 . Finally, since
Ps−1




s=1 (rsz + αs)rsz = γ>0, it follows that for some
s ≤ s − 1, rsz 6=0 , which implies that πi ({s}) > 0 and rsz>0.
Lemma 2 Fi,j is transverse to 0.
Let Ri,j ⊆
¡
RA¢S be the set of asset returns on which j’s beliefs are constrained com-
patible with i’s beliefs.
12Proposition 6 If A<s−s+1,t h e nRi,j contains an open subset of full Lebesgue measure.











t 0, is open and has full Lebesgue measure. Let
(rs)
S













has full row rank. Now, Dz,α,β,γFi,j has S +1rows and
A +s −1+S −s +1columns, and, since A<s −s +1 , it follows that it has strictly more
rows than columns, which is impossible. It follows that (rs)
S
s=1 ∈ R only if it is not true
that
³













which means, by proposition 5, that (rs)
S
s=1 ∈ R only if (rs)
S
s=1 ∈ Ri,j.
The important implication is that constrained compatibility holds, generically, for any πi
and πj, regardless of absolute continuity. Since I is ﬁnite, pairwise constrained compatibility
holds generically.
4C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s :










Modulo the diﬀerences in the models, we have shown that under market incompleteness
traders may disagree in their beliefs. First,
Existence of equilibrium trade =⇒ Constrained consistency of beliefs ,
13while
Constrained consistency of beliefs
and
Positivity of Returns
=⇒ Existence of equilibrium trade .
So it is the (pairwise) consistency of individual beliefs, merely up to the trading opportunities
oﬀered by the asset market, that determines existence of equilibrium trade. As expected,
Consistency of beliefs =⇒ Constrained consistency of beliefs
and,
Constrained consistency of beliefs
and
Market completeness
=⇒ Consistency of beliefs ,
so, as in [1],
Existence of equilibrium trade
and
Market completeness
=⇒ Consistency of beliefs .
However, enough incompleteness destroys last implication in a very robust way: even with
inconsistent beliefs, for almost all possible values of asset returns, beliefs are still constrained
consistent.
14Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. First, let z ∈ Zi (q).
If 1 does not hold, let e z = z + z. Then, −qe z = −qz − qz > −qz,a n d
rsz>r se z ⇐⇒ 0 >r sz =⇒ πi ({s})=0 .
It follows that vi (e z) >v i (z), which is impossible, since wi
0 − qe z>w i
0 − qz ≥ 0,a n d ,f o r
every s ∈ Si, wi
s + rse z ≥ wi
s + rsz ≥ 0.
If 2 does not hold, let e z = z + z. Then, −q · e z = −q · z and, as before, πi ({s}) > 0 only
if rsz ≤ rse z. Moreover, for some s ∈ S, πi ({s}) > 0 and rsz>0,s orse z>r sz. Again,
vi (e z) >v i (z), which is a contradiction, because wi
0 − qe z = wi
0 − qz ≥ 0, and, for every
s ∈ Si, wi
s + rse z ≥ wi
s + rsz ≥ 0.
Now, suppose that 1 and 2 hold. Renumber states if necessary, so that πi ({s}) > 0 ⇐⇒






has full column rank. Since




















































s=1 = V z. It is straightforward that z ∈ Zi (q).I f
∃b z ∈ RA such that Rib z =0 , then, by 1, qb z =0 ,s oZi (q) = argmaxz∈B(q)\[Ri]⊥ vi
q (z) and
t h er e s u l tf o l l o w sf r o mt h ea r g u m e n ta b o v e .
15Proof of lemma 2. With the following representative components of the function:
⎛


















s=1 (rsz + αs)rsz − γ
⎞
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
,
and with the representative arguments in the following order,
µ∙
zα 1 ... α s−1 βs+1 ... βs r1 ... r s−1 rs ... r s rs+1 ... r S γ
¸¶
,






is the following matrix




















0.S i n c e
Ps−1
s=1 (rsz + αs)rsz +
Ps
s=s rsz = γ>0, it follows that z 6=0 .
Fix s ≤ s − 1.I frsz =0 , it follows that (2rsz − αs)z> = −αsz> and since αs > 0 and
z 6=0 , we can perturb the s-th row, without perturbing any of the other ﬁrst S rows of the
matrix. If rsz 6=0 , we can obtain the same result by perturbing the column corresponding
to αs.
Consider now s ≤ s ≤ s.S i n c ez 6=0 ,w ec a np e r t u r bt h es-th row, without perturbing
16any of the other ﬁrst S rows of the matrix.
Now, for s ≥ s +1 , suppose that rsz =0 ; it follows that (2rsz + βs)z> = βsz>,a n d ,
since βs > 0 and z 6=0 , that we can perturb the s-th row, without perturbing any of the
other ﬁrst S rows of the matrix. If, alternatively, rsz 6=0 , we can obtain the same result by
perturbing the column corresponding to βs.
This implies that the matrix, without its last column and its last row, has full row rank.
It follows from the introduction of the last row and the last column, that DFi,j has full row
rank.
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